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The Case for Safe and Transparent Checking Accounts
Hidden Risks
exeCuTive summaRy
A checking account is the most basic and necessary financial product for American consumers. 
Nine out of 10 Americans have a checking account, making it the most widely utilized financial 
services product in the United States. The federal government recognizes the importance 
of checking and other deposit accounts by insuring deposits up to $250,000 per account 
against the failure of the bank.1 Checking accounts provide a secure way for Americans to 
collect earnings and make payments, and for many, they serve as the entry to the financial 
mainstream, where savings and credit products are available. As the vehicles for billions of 
transactions each day, checking accounts are essential to the national economy.
This ubiquitous product is at the center of profound changes to our system of transacting. 
Paper checks are increasingly a thing of the past as Americans use debit cards to access 
their checking accounts. The Check Clearing for the 21st Century Act of 2003 (Check 21 Act) 
allowed banks greater freedom to transmit funds electronically and reduced the paper trail 
provided to consumers.2 Overdraft coverage programs once reserved for occasional use are 
now widespread. These changes are little understood by consumers, and their impact has 
been little studied. Scarce comprehensive data exist on the state of checking accounts in 
today’s modern world.
In October 2010, the Pew Health Group’s Safe Checking in the Electronic Age Project began a 
study of checking account terms and conditions to examine both the state of the marketplace 
and the effect of current regulations covering checking accounts. Pew analyzed more than 250 
types of checking accounts offered online by the 10 largest banks in the United States, which 
hold nearly 60 percent of all deposit volume nationwide. In researching checking accounts, Pew 
charted the median and the range for many fees; the variations in key practices; and the extent 
of certain practices, including some that are the subject of legal challenges (see Table 4).3 
Through this research, we identified five practices that put consumers at financial risk, 
potentially exposing them to high costs for little benefit.
Pew’s findings are as follows:
•	 banks do not provide important policies and fee information in a concise and easy-to-
understand format that allows customers to compare account terms and conditions 
among banks. Pew’s research showed that the median length of bank disclosures for 
key checking account policies and fee information was 111 pages. In addition, the banks 
often used different names for the same fee or service; put the information in different 
documents, different media (Web or hard copy), or different locations in a document; and 
did not summarize or collect key information anywhere.
•	 accountholders are not provided full information about the respective costs of overdraft 
options. All 10 of the banks in the study, for at least some transactions, offered programs—
“overdraft penalty plans”—in which the bank covers overdrafts for a set per-overdraft charge. 
Nine of the 10 banks also offered “overdraft transfer plans” in which the bank transfers funds 
to cover overdrafts in a customer’s checking account from the customer’s savings account, 
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credit card, or line of credit. Customers can also choose not to enroll in any overdraft plan 
to avoid these fees for ATM and point-of-sale (POS) debit card transactions. These plans 
have significantly different features and fees; however, banks are not required to provide full 
information at the time of opt-in about all overdraft options available, including the price for 
lower-cost options.
•	 bank overdraft penalty fees are disproportionate to the size of the median overdraft 
amount. Overdraft fees will cost American consumers an estimated $38 billion in 2011—an 
all-time high.4 The median overdraft amount is $36, yet the median overdraft penalty fee 
is $35. In addition, the majority of checking accounts charged an extended overdraft fee 
after a median of seven days if the fees and principal were not paid. The median extended 
overdraft fee was $25. While banks have to incur a risk that they will not be repaid, most 
institutions manage this by limiting the overdraft amount given to any customer.5 Banks have 
long argued that overdraft penalty fees are not compensation for the cost of overdrafts to the 
bank but rather are designed to deter customers from repeating this behavior. Penalty fees in 
other consumer financial products (e.g., credit cards) are related in size to the violation.
•	 banks reserve the right to reorder transactions in a manner that will maximize 
overdraft fees. Overdraft penalty fees are imposed each time a withdrawal is posted to an 
account with insufficient funds to cover it at that moment. Banks can maximize the number 
of times an account “goes negative” by reordering deposits and withdrawals to reduce the 
account balance as quickly as possible. Posting withdrawals before deposits and posting 
withdrawals from largest to smallest have the effect of maximizing overdrafts. Currently, no 
federal regulation governs posting order.6 Only two banks in this study, representing 48 
percent of accounts, commit to posting deposits before withdrawals. The rest reserve the 
right to post withdrawals first. As of October 2010, when Pew collected its data, all banks 
studied reserved the right to reorder transactions from highest to lowest amount. Since 
then, a limited number of banks have altered this policy and no longer post all withdrawals 
from highest to lowest for all of their accounts.
•	 more than 80 percent of accounts examined contain either binding mandatory 
arbitration agreements or fee-sharing provisions that require the accountholder to pay 
the bank’s losses, costs, and expenses in a legal dispute regardless of the outcome 
of the case.7 Seventy-one percent of account agreements reviewed by Pew require 
accountholders to submit to the decision of a private arbitrator selected by the bank in 
the case of a dispute. An additional 12 percent of checking account agreements in this 
study provided that accountholders have the right to settle their claims in a court, but the 
customer is liable for the bank’s losses, costs, and expenses regardless of outcome. In the 
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, Congress required the newly 
created Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) to look at mandatory arbitration in 
contracts for financial products and services and, based on the findings, authorized the 
CFPB to write new rules limiting these clauses.8
Based on these findings, Pew recommends the following policy solutions to protect 
consumers, promote a competitive marketplace, and foster a level playing field among 
financial institutions:
•	 Policy makers should require depository institutions to provide information about checking 
account terms, conditions, and fees in a concise, easy-to-read format, similar to the 
Schumer Box used for credit cards.9
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•	 Policy makers should require depository institutions to provide accountholders with clear, 
comprehensive pricing information for all available overdraft options when a customer is 
considering opting in to a program so that the customer can make the best choice among 
overdraft options, including choosing not to opt in for any overdraft coverage.
•	 Policy makers should require overdraft penalty fees to be reasonable and proportional to the 
bank’s costs in providing the overdraft loan. Furthermore, we suggest that regulators monitor 
overdraft transfer fees and impose similar reasonable and proportional requirements if it 
appears that they are becoming so disproportionate as to suggest that they have become 
penalty fees as well.
•	 Policy makers should require depository institutions to post deposits and withdrawals in a 
fully disclosed, objective and neutral manner that does not maximize overdraft fees, such 
as in chronological order.
•	 The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, in its study of arbitration agreements, should 
examine the prevalence of binding arbitration clauses; of fee shifting provisions; and 
of “loss, costs, and expenses” clauses in checking accounts and assess whether such 
provisions prevent consumers from obtaining relief.
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inTRoduCTion
A checking account is the financial cornerstone for the overwhelming majority of American 
families—often the bank product that provides consumer entry into the financial mainstream. 
Nine in 10 adult Americans have a checking account, representing a significantly larger 
proportion of the population than those holding a mortgage or credit card.10 Millions of 
consumers use bank or credit union checking accounts every day to collect their earnings and 
pay their bills. The federal government, through the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
(FDIC), encourages the use of checking accounts by providing a guarantee that the money in 
them (up to $250,000 per account) is safe even if the bank fails.11 As a result of these factors, 
checking accounts have come to play a vital role in the American economy by facilitating the 
safekeeping and transfer of funds for consumers and offering a gateway to savings and credit 
required for investments such as the purchase of homes and higher education. It is to the 
benefit of banks and consumers, and the nation as a whole, that checking accounts be safe 
and user friendly.
Yet checking accounts lack some important types of consumer protections compared to other 
consumer financial products. For example, credit cards have limitations on the dollar amount 
of late fees and over-the-limit fees.12 In addition, their applications must clearly and concisely 
disclose key terms in what is known as a “Schumer Box” (see Figure 2).13 In contrast, checking 
accounts have neither limitations on fees nor any requirements that critical information be 
presented in a consolidated format.
Regulators are authorized by federal banking laws to reduce risks to consumers in checking 
accounts, but that authority has not been actively utilized.14 Checking accounts are subject to 
disclosure requirements under the Truth in Savings Act and the Electronic Fund Transfer Act.15 
However, Pew’s research shows that these requirements have not been effective in producing 
clear and useful information for consumers. In addition, the Electronic Fund Transfer Act and the 
Uniform Commercial Code provide certain dispute rights to consumers.16 The Expedited Funds 
Availability Act governs how long a bank may hold a deposit before posting it to a customer’s 
checking account.17 Despite substantial advances in technology that speed the processing of a 
deposit, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve (the Fed) has only recently proposed 
the first update in over 20 years to the relevant regulations.18 Protections are also found in the 
Federal Trade Commission Act (FTCA), which defines “unfair or deceptive acts or practices” 
(UDAP) and allows certain banking regulators to ban such practices, yet no federal agency has 
ever applied these provisions to checking account practices.19
Nine of the 10 banks in our study are currently supervised by the Office of the Comptroller of 
the Currency.20 The Fed, under the FTCA, has the authority to write UDAP regulations governing 
providers of checking accounts and other consumer financial products.21 However, the Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 transfers rule-writing authority 
and supervision for all 10 of the banks that Pew examined to the new Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau (CFPB), and its regulatory reach will include the power to ban those practices 
that are deemed to be “abusive” and “unfair or deceptive.”22 Beyond this broad authority, the 
CFPB is also authorized to write regulations to ensure that the features of any consumer financial 
product or service are fully, accurately, and effectively disclosed.23
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What Does “abusive”24 Mean?
The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 defines as 
“abusive” any act or practice that:
“materially interferes with the ability of a consumer to understand a term or condition of a 
consumer financial product or service; or takes unreasonable advantage of
a) a lack of understanding on the part of the consumer of the material risks, costs, or 
conditions of the product or service;
b) the inability of the consumer to protect the interests of the consumer in selecting or 
using a consumer financial product or service; or
c) the reasonable reliance by the consumer on a covered person [a provider of a 
consumer financial product or service] to act in the interests of the consumer.”
In October 2010, the Pew Health Group’s Safe Checking in the Electronic Age Project began a 
study of checking account terms and conditions to examine both the state of the marketplace 
and the effect of current regulations covering checking accounts. This expansive research 
analyzed more than 250 types of checking accounts offered online by the 10 largest banks in 
the United States, which hold nearly 60 percent of all deposit volume nationwide.25
To evaluate the safety and transparency of checking accounts, Pew sought to quantify both 
the types and size of fees, as well as the important bank policies that Americans are most 
likely to encounter while using their checking accounts. In researching checking accounts, 
Pew charted the median and the range for many fees; the variations in key practices; and 
the extent of certain practices, including some that are the subject of legal challenges.26 Pew 
researchers collected checking account data found both online and in paper copy at bank 
branches (see Appendix B: Methodology).27
From this research, we identified patterns that impose hidden, unnecessary, and potentially 
dangerous risks on consumers. Based on these findings, we segmented this paper into 
five topic areas: disclosure, overdraft options, overdraft fees, processing of deposits and 
withdrawals, and dispute resolution. Potential solutions to undue risks are also indentified.
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i. disClosuRe
Product information, from nutrition labels on food to dealer stickers on new cars, allows 
consumers to make informed choices when selecting and purchasing goods. In the world of 
consumer finance, disclosure functions as the threshold mechanism to protect consumers. 
Full and accurate transparency in fees and services is essential to keeping consumer markets 
fair for both buyers and sellers. Disclosure is critical to promote competition, which requires 
informed customers who can rationally choose among available products and services.
The checking accounts in this study had a median of 111 pages of disclosure documents, 
consisting of account agreements, addendums to account agreements, fee schedules, and 
pages on the bank’s Web site. Many of these documents are not user friendly, with much 
of the text densely printed, difficult to decipher, and highly technical and legalistic. For an 
excerpt of a disclosure document, see Figure 1.
None of the banks examined collected key information in a single place. Rather, most 
disperse key terms and conditions across multiple lengthy documents of different types, 
making it extremely difficult for consumers to identify and locate the information they need 
when comparing and choosing checking accounts. Further complicating the matter, different 
banks locate the same information in different places. As a result, consumers must navigate a 
confusing maze of disclosure documents in their efforts to locate all of the important account 
information. Pew’s research indicates a need for improved, organized disclosure of the terms 
and conditions of checking accounts.
Only two pieces of information were generally accessible on every account’s Web page: the 
monthly fee and a list of possible ways to avoid the monthly fee. Key terms and conditions such 
as the amount of any overdraft fee or stop payment fee were not available on the account Web 
pages of nine out of 10 banks in the study. As noted in Table 1, Bank of America provided the 
most information for account terms and fees. However, six key terms were not available on any 
of the banks’ account Web pages: the order in which the bank processed credits and debits, 
the overdraft transfer fee, the fee when a bank rejects a check written to the customer for 
nonsufficient funds, dispute restrictions, other service fees, and the deposit hold policy.
Because there is no industry-wide consensus on terminology, different names are used for 
the same fees and stipulations. For example, what this report refers to as an overdraft penalty 
fee was described by different banks variably as an “overdraft fee,” “overdraft item fee,” 
“insufficient funds fee,” “unavailable funds fee,” “overdraft item paid fee,” “unavailable funds 
penalty,” or a “returned/paid items fee.”
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Banks Bank ofAmerica Chase Citibank
Capital 
OneSunTrustTD BankPNC
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
minimum 
needed to open
monthly fee
Requirements to 
Waive monthly fee
interest*
fees at 
proprietary aTms**
fees at 
non-proprietary 
bank aTms**
overdraft 
penalty fee
maximum number
of overdraft fees 
per day
extended 
overdrawn fee
nsf fee
stop payment fee
HSBC
TABle 1:  Accessibility of Important Account Information
are the most important fees and policies commonly located on each account’s  Web page? 
Yes
YesYes
YesYes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
U.S.
Bank
Wells 
Fargo
note: Data represent 265 checking accounts offered by the 10 largest american banks by deposit, which collectively hold nearly 60 percent of all 
deposits in the united states, and are current as of october 2010. banks are listed from left to right in order of deposit volume held. this table 
shows whether each piece of important account information for consumers, as determined by Pew, was most often located on each account’s Web 
page on the banks’ Web sites. For instance, if the majority of a bank’s account Web pages did not disclose the fee or provision, the corresponding 
box in table 1 is blank.
*a minority of checking accounts in the study provide interest. Data reflect whether the account Web page mentions this feature in any way.
**Multiple fees at atMs may be charged for items such as a statement copy fee. Data here include whether a fee for cash withdrawal is disclosed.
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Note: This snapshot of text is on page 20 of SunTrust’s “Rules and Regulations for Deposit Accounts.”
FIgUre 1:  Sample Page from a Checking Account Agreement
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Discussion
Federal regulators have abundant legal authority to prescribe clear and helpful disclosure 
for checking accounts. The Truth in Savings Act (TISA) requires banks to offer a schedule of 
specified terms and conditions for all deposit accounts prior to account opening that must be 
available on demand to consumers so that they can “understand and compare accounts.”28 
TISA provides authority to issue regulations, enforce its requirements, and issue model forms 
for disclosure.29 Similarly, the Electronic Fund Transfer Act requires financial institutions to 
disclose the terms and conditions when a consumer signs up for electronic fund transfer 
services, such as an ATM card or a debit card.30 In addition, this act allows regulators to issue 
rules, enforce its requirements, and issue model clauses to facilitate compliance.31
Current regulations leave some gaps that permit the less-than-optimal disclosure observed by 
Pew researchers. Under TISA regulations, banks must disclose the minimum balance required 
to open an account, as well as a schedule of all account fees with the conditions under 
which each fee will be assessed.32 The disclosures must be made “clearly and conspicuously, 
in writing, and in a form the consumer may keep.”33 However, there are no requirements 
pertaining to format or layout (e.g., font size, order, or page length).34 Disclosure can also 
be made in combination with other account terms and other types of accounts.35 Further 
regulations under the Electronic Fund Transfer Act require institutions to disclose fees and 
limitations on electronic fund transfers, as well as a summary of the accountholder’s liability 
for unauthorized transfers.36 In contrast to TISA regulations, the Electronic Fund Transfer Act 
disclosure requirements do not apply to potential customers.37
Disclosures are critical for consumers to make informed decisions, but the information needs 
to be presented in a format that is clear and understandable. They should convey key terms 
and conditions with clarity so that consumers can compare products and make purchasing 
decisions that best meet their needs. Based on the Schumer Box, which provides information 
on these fees and terms for credit cards, Pew has developed a disclosure box to give similar 
information to checking account customers.
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FIgUre 2:  Pew’s Model Disclosure Box for Checking Accounts
BASIC TERMS AND CONDITIONS
account
opening 
and usage
overdraft
options for 
Consumers 
with debit 
Cards
processing
policies
dispute 
Resolution
Minimum Deposit Needed to Open Account
Monthly Fee
Requirements to Waive Monthly Fee
Interest Rate
ATM Fees
ATM Fees
Non-Sufficient Funds (NSF) Fee
Returned Check Fee
Stop Payment Fee
Account Closing Fee
Other Service Fees
No Overdraft Service 
Overdraft Transfer Fee
Overdraft Penalty Fee
Maximum Number of Overdraft 
 Penalty Fees per Day
Extended Overdraft Penalty Fee
Posting Order
The order in which withdrawals and 
deposits are processed
Deposit Hold Policy
When funds deposited to your account 
are available
Dispute Resolution Agreement
$
$
   Minimum combined account balance, 
  direct deposit or other conditions
%
$ for using your bank’s aTm
$  for using another bank’s aTm
$  per item
$  per declined check written to your account
$  per item to stop payment for up to x months
$  if account closed within y days of opening
   please consult the back of this document for a list of 
additional service fees.
   
 if you choose not to opt in to any kind of overdraft service,
 transactions that would cause an overdraft will be declined 
at no cost to you.
$  per overdraft covered by transfer from linked savings
 account, line of credit, or credit card
$  per overdraft covered by bank advance
 
$  every mth day the account is overdrawn, starting  
n days after the account is first overdrawn
  Summary of policy 
     
•	Cash	deposit	with	teller:	x business day
•	Cash	deposit	at	aTm: x business day
•	Check	deposit	with	teller:	y business day
•	Check	deposit	at	aTm: y business day
•	Direct	deposit:	x business day
•	Wire	transfer:	x business day
•	If	something	causes	a	longer	hold	on	a	deposit,	the	first	$200	
of that deposit will be made available either the same 
business day of the deposit or the next business day.
•	Funds	from	non-bank	checks	may	take	an	extra	business	day	
to become available.
  A “business day” is a non-holiday weekday. The   
 end of a business day varies by branch, but it is no   
 earlier than T p.m.
   Summary of agreement
Option A: 
(Default)
Option B:
Option C: 
Overdraft 
Penalty 
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ii. oveRdRafT opTions
Currently, there are two main categories of overdraft products. Because banks describe these 
using dissimilar terms, for the purposes of this report, “overdraft penalty plans” are defined 
as short-term advances made for a fee by the bank to cover an overdraft. On the other hand, 
“overdraft transfer plans” involve a transfer from another account or plan, either a savings 
account, credit card, or overdraft line of credit, to pay for any overdrafts. Customers must 
affirmatively sign up for such plans and establish the second account.
overdraft penalty plans
Every checking account analyzed offered an overdraft penalty plan for at least some 
transactions. Under such plans, when a customer’s withdrawal or purchase exceeds the 
checking account balance, the bank has the discretion to allow the transaction and pay—for 
a fee—the overdraft via a short-term advance; however, the bank is not obligated to cover 
any overdrafts. If the bank covers the transaction, the customer must repay both the overdraft 
amount and the fee in a short period of time—usually less than a week—or incur another fee 
known as an extended overdraft fee.
As of August 15, 2010, financial institutions must obtain the affirmative consent (known as 
opt-in) of customers before enrolling them in an overdraft penalty plan that covers debit 
card transactions at points-of-sale and ATMs.38 If a customer does not opt in, any debit card 
transactions that overdraw the account will be denied with no fee charged. However, banks 
can apply overdraft penalty plans for overdrafts by checks and deductions made through the 
Automated Clearinghouse (ACH) network without obtaining affirmative customer consent.
Two of the banks included in this study, Bank of America and Citibank, have publicly indicated 
that they will not charge overdraft penalties on either debit or ATM transactions.39 While Bank 
of America specifically states this in its account disclosures, Pew researchers were unable to 
find similar explicit disclosure in the Citibank “Client Manual.”40
overdraft Transfer plans
Nine of 10 banks studied (representing 98 percent of accounts) offered overdraft transfer 
plans. In such plans, if a customer makes a transaction that overdraws his or her checking 
account, the bank arranges for the payment of that transaction by transferring money to 
the customer’s checking account from the customer’s linked savings account, credit card, or 
overdraft line of credit. The bank charges a fee for processing this transfer of funds.
Discussion
Pew research shows that, while overdraft transfer plans require accountholders to set up 
a linked account, they may be a preferable choice for most consumers because (1) the 
fee per overdraft is less than an overdraft penalty fee (a median of $10 as opposed to a 
median of $35); (2) there is no risk of extended overdraft fees since the overdraft itself is 
repaid immediately; (3) the bank must cover the overdraft if there are sufficient funds in the 
linked account and if the maximum number of permissible transfers has not been previously 
exceeded; and (4) for transfers from overdraft lines of credit and credit cards, the consumer 
is generally permitted a longer timeframe to repay the credit and may sometimes do so in 
installments.41
The Fed has recently enacted rules that prohibit banks from charging overdraft penalty fees 
on ATM and POS debit cards unless the individual has opted in. While no current regulation 
requires that comprehensive information about all available overdraft options (including 
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fee amount) be provided at the time the accountholder seeks overdraft coverage, financial 
institutions that offer overdraft penalty plans must provide a form that discloses these options. 
The customer must agree to the terms and sign the form in order to opt in.42 The Fed’s model 
opt-in form describes overdraft penalty plans as the “standard overdraft” option and only 
briefly mentions the existence of other alternatives. While a description of price and the 
circumstances under which the overdraft penalty fee will be assessed is included, the model 
form does not include the price of overdraft transfers.43 In addition, the Fed’s form does not 
discuss the option not to opt in to overdraft coverage, a choice that would allow customers to 
avoid exceeding their available balance or incurring any overdraft fees. The Fed could modify 
this form to require additional disclosure regarding overdraft transfer plans.
iii. oveRdRafT fees
overdraft penalty fee
When a bank uses an advance to cover a transaction that would overdraw a checking account, 
it charges an overdraft penalty fee. Pew’s research found that the median overdraft penalty 
fee was $35, with a range of $10 to $36.
The FDIC’s research shows that the median overdraft amount is $36.44 If the median overdraft 
penalty fee of $35 is applied to a $36 overdraft with a repayment period of seven days, the 
APR, or annual percentage rate, on the typical overdraft would be over 5,000 percent—a 
costly way to address credit needs.45
maximum number of overdraft penalties per day
Nine out of 10 banks (representing 98 percent of accounts discussed herein) put a limit on the 
number of overdraft penalty fees charged to a customer on a given day. Banks may choose 
to decline additional overdraft transactions that exceed this daily limit. The median cap on 
overdraft penalties per day for the studied accounts was four, with the range being three to 
six overdrafts per day. Under this system, median overdraft penalty fees of $35 thus make it 
possible for a customer to be charged $140 or more per day. The 10th bank sets no cap on 
overdraft penalty fees per day.
extended overdraft penalty fee
If a customer’s account remains overdrawn for a specified number of days, banks will charge 
an extended overdraft penalty fee for every given number of days that the account remains 
overdrawn, meaning that a single overdraft in a penalty program can trigger multiple fees if 
not repaid promptly. Banks also refer to these fees as “sustained” or “continuous” overdraft 
fees. Six of the 10 banks examined (representing 45 percent of accounts) charged extended 
overdraft fees.
The median extended overdraft penalty fee was $25, with the fee varying among accounts 
from $7 to $36. The median number of days that an account must be overdrawn in order 
to begin incurring extended overdraft penalty fees was seven days. Thereafter, the median 
interval number of days before the next extended overdraft penalty fee could be charged was 
also seven days, with a range of five to 10 days.
One bank (two percent of accounts) capped the cumulative total of extended overdraft 
penalty fees that a customer could accrue in one continuous period at $98. However, it 
started charging a $7 extended overdraft fee after only four days, charging a fee every day 
the account remained overdrawn up to the $98 cap. In this scenario, a customer could be 
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charged an overdraft penalty fee and a subsequent $98 in extended overdraft fees for only a 
single overdraft violation.
overdraft Transfer fee
The median overdraft transfer fee was $10. These fees ranged from $5 to $20. Because the 
overdraft is repaid immediately using an accountholder’s own funds under this plan, the 
customer incurs no extended overdraft fee.
maximum number of overdraft Transfers per day
For those overdraft transfer plans in which the linked account is a savings account, there 
are restrictions on the number of transfers allowed under federal law. Regulation D (Reg. D) 
limits electronic withdrawals (i.e., those not made at a teller or an ATM) to six per month or 
statement cycle.46 For overdraft transfer plans in which the linked account is a credit card or 
line of credit, the maximum number of overdraft transfers in a given period, if there is one, 
varied according to the terms of the specific account agreement for the linked account.
non-sufficient funds fee
All banks disclosed a Non-Sufficient Funds (NSF) fee. If a customer attempts to make a check 
payment that would overdraw his or her account, and if the bank chooses not to cover this 
attempted transaction, then the bank will charge the customer an NSF fee. However, if a 
customer has an overdraft transfer plan, an NSF fee is triggered only if the check amount 
exceeds what is available from the linked accounts. The median NSF fee was $35, with a 
range of $10 to $36.
Discussion
Overdraft fees and practices cost consumers billions of dollars every year and put many at 
risk for loss of their checking accounts.47 Two academic studies conducted in 2008 found 
that virtually all involuntary checking account closures are the result of too many instances 
of the consumer’s account being overdrawn.48 Regulators have noted this risk as well. In its 
November 2010 Overdraft Payment Supervisory Guidance, the FDIC stated: “Extremely high 
costs in comparison to the overdraft benefit and/or permitting product over-use often result in 
customer dissatisfaction and complaints. Serious financial harm can result for consumers with 
a low or fixed income.”49
Neither the number nor the amount of overdraft penalty fees is limited by UDAP protections.50 
Moreover, there are no federal regulations stating when an extended overdraft fee for the 
same transaction can be imposed.51 Of the banking regulators, the FDIC has taken the lead in 
addressing overdraft fees. The FDIC’s November 2010 guidance to its member banks advised 
them to contact customers who overdraw their accounts six times in a 12-month period to 
discuss alternate options to overdraft penalty plans, such as overdraft transfers, small-dollar 
loans or opting out of overdraft penalty plans.52 In 2005, the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) 
provided similar guidance to savings and loan institutions, though it stopped short of specific 
guidelines for when accountholders should be contacted.53 To date, other regulators have not 
followed suit with promoting alternate options. Indeed, none of the banks in the Pew study 
are supervised by the FDIC or OTS, so their guidance does not apply to them.
Unpredictable and repeated overdraft fees pose particular dangers to those who maintain 
smaller balances with less of a cushion to absorb unexpected charges. While many 
accountholders have an occasional overdraft, research by the FDIC and others indicates that a 
relatively small group of consumers regularly incurs overdrafts.54 These customers tend to be 
new entrants to banking—young persons and low- and moderate-income individuals—exactly 
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those who can least afford substantial overdraft fees.55 Previous Pew research demonstrates the 
risks that overdraft penalty fees pose for low-income individuals. Pew’s study of economically 
poor areas of Los Angeles found that “fully 18% of the [consumers who] banked in the Los 
Angeles neighborhoods surveyed incurred insufficient funds or overdraft fees three or more 
times in the past year. Of those who have overdrafted their account, nearly three-quarters (72%) 
‘did not know they were out of money’ at the time.”56
Overdraft fees far exceed the incremental cost to the bank of providing this service since 
these transactions, designed to be paid back with the customer’s next deposit, pose minimal 
credit risk. Yet banks maintain that overdraft penalty fees are just that—penalties—and are 
meant to deter customers from overdrafting.57 However, if the point is to deter customers 
from exceeding their account balance, the most direct way to do this is to simply deny the 
overdraft itself.
Other such penalty fees in the consumer financial arena are subject to a reasonable and 
proportional standard.58 For example, the Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and 
Disclosure Act of 2009 (Credit CARD Act) addressed the size of penalty fees in credit cards 
by requiring that the fees be “reasonable and proportional” to a cardholder’s act or omission 
and prohibiting multiple fees for the same transaction.59 Pursuant to that mandate, the Fed 
has issued rules restricting credit card penalty fees, with some exceptions, and provided 
a “safe harbor” of the lesser of the amount of the violation or a limit of $25 for the first 
transgression.60 While not mandatory, this regulatory safe harbor provides a model attractive 
to credit card companies seeking certainty that their fees will be approved by regulators and 
upheld by courts.
Overdraft transfer plans generally are better products for consumers since they help them 
live within their means and cut off the potential for a cycle of debt. However, rising overdraft 
transfer fees disincentivize savings and push customers into overdraft penalty plans. These 
trends could be worsened if overdraft penalty fees are regulated while transfer fees are not. 
Transfer fees are already high: $10 can be considered an excessive charge for a consumer to 
access his or her own money, and as such it is hard to justify this as the incremental cost of the 
service to the bank.
iv. pRoCessing of deposiTs and WiTHdRaWals
Transactions presented on a given day for posting are frequently processed in an order 
different from that in which they occurred. Such a reordering can greatly impact the overdraft 
fees incurred by consumers. Pew’s research shows that, in October 2010, only one of the 10 
banks studied, representing less than five percent of accounts, informed accountholders of 
the order in which all debits and credits are posted.
Two of the 10 banks studied (representing 48 percent of accounts) informed customers that 
they process credits before debits for that day. The other eight reserved the right to process 
debits before credits. Of these, two (representing 20 percent of accounts) explicitly reminded 
customers that the posting order was at the bank’s discretion, and six (32 percent of accounts) 
failed to disclose their debit-credit processing order, implicitly retaining the right to post 
debits before credits.
As of October 2010, when Pew collected its data, all banks and all accounts in Pew’s study 
reserved the right to process all debits presented in a given day from highest dollar amount 
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to lowest dollar amount. Since that time some banks have begun disclosing changes to their 
practices. For example, Wells Fargo, Chase, and Citibank disclosed that they would no longer 
reorder certain types of transactions for at least a portion of their accounts.61 A recent court 
ruling required Wells Fargo to change its policy on deposit sequencing. Pursuant to a court 
order arising from the California case Gutierrez v. Wells Fargo, Wells Fargo has stated that 
it will now process ATM and debit card transactions from low to high for accounts in that 
state. Wells Fargo has indicated that beginning in May 2011, it will post most transactions 
chronologically or low to high for all accounts. Chase Bank also updated its posting order 
policy for all of its accounts and disclosed that it processes debits “in the order in which they 
were authorized, withdrawn, cashed, or deposited, as appropriate. When this is not possible 
because of the bundling of transactions, the posting order will be from highest to lowest 
amount.”62 It has been reported that as of July 2011, Citibank will begin clearing smaller 
checks before larger ones.63
Discussion
Currently, there are no federal regulations that govern the order of posting among 
transactions processed on the same day. There is no legal requirement that banks post 
deposits before withdrawals, nor any law or regulation governing the order in which they 
post either debits or credits.64 Some banking regulators have chosen to advise the financial 
institutions under their jurisdiction on best practices regarding transaction posting procedures. 
However, this guidance does not constitute comprehensive federal regulation. The FDIC’s 
November 2010 overdraft guidance states that FDIC-member banks should review their 
checking procedures to “ensure they operate in a manner that avoids maximizing customer 
overdrafts and related fees through the clearing order.”65
Only one of the banks in our study explicitly stated the order in which it posts all transactions 
(both debits and credits) for some, if not all, accounts. For those who do not have accounts 
with this bank, even the most careful accountholders cannot predict or control the fees 
resulting from hidden posting order practices.66
Posting orders that maximize overdraft fees, especially those that post withdrawals from 
largest to smallest (for an example, see Table 2), continue to be the subject of numerous 
court challenges as an unfair and deceptive practice under state laws.67 Plaintiffs argue that 
the practice enriches the bank at the expense of consumers who receive no benefit from the 
reordering of their daily debits or credits.68 In response, banks have argued that customers 
prefer the largest withdrawals to be posted first because these are the most important (e.g., 
rent or mortgage payments) and, therefore, the transactions that one wants to have paid 
first.69 However, by opting in to overdraft coverage, the customer has expressed the desire to 
have all overdrafts covered regardless of size.
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 High-to-low Posting:  Chronological Posting:
 How the bank ordered transactions How the transactions actually occurred
 daTe TRansaCTion  desCRipTion $ +/– balanCe daTe TRansaCTion desCRipTion $ +/– balanCe
 10/5 starting balance  $316.90 10/5 starting balance  $316.90
 10/5 – 5 Return of Autozone    10/5 – 1 Debit card purchase at 
  purchase $17.23    Subway Restaurant –$11.27
      $334.13      $305.63
 10/10 – 1 Online transfer of funds to    10/5 – 2 Debit card purchase at
  another account –$80.00   Autozone –$47.99
      $254.13      $257.64
 10/6 – 3 ATM withdrawal at a    10/5 – 3 Debit card purchase at
  Non-Wells Fargo ATM –$22.00   Autozone –$17.23
      $232.13      $240.41
 10/6 – 4 Non-Wells Fargo ATM fee   10/5 – 4 Debit card purchase at
   –$2.00   Autozone –$3.23
      $230.13      $237.18
 10/7 – 1 Debit card purchase at    10/5 – 5 Return of Autozone 
  Albertsons Supermarket –$74.39     purchase $17.23
    $155.74      $254.41
 10/10 – 2 Check #1103   10/6 – 1 Debit card purchase at
   –$65.00   IHOP Restaurant –$26.51
      $91.74      $227.90
 10/5 – 2 Debit card purchase at    10/6 – 2 Debit card purchase at
  Autozone –$47.99   Farmer Boys Restaurant –$8.10
      $42.75      $219.80
 10/6 – 1 Debit card purchase at    10/6 – 3 ATM withdrawal at a
  IHOP Restaurant –$26.51   Non-Wells Fargo ATM –$22.00
      $16.24      $197.80
 10/5 – 3 Debit card purchase at    10/6 – 4 Non-Wells Fargo ATM fee
  Autozone –$17.23    –$2.00
      -$0.99      $195.80
   Overdraft Penalty Fee   10/7 – 1 Debit card purchase at 
   –$22.00   Albertsons Supermarket –$74.39
       –$22.99      $121.41
 10/5 – 1 Debit card purchase at    10/10 – 1 Online transfer of funds to
  Subway Restaurant –$11.27   another account –$80.00
      –$34.26      $41.41
   Overdraft Penalty Fee   10/10 – 2 Check #1103 
   –$22.00    –$65.00
      –$56.26      –$23.59
 10/6 – 2 Debit card purchase at     Overdraft Penalty Fee
  Farmer Boys Restaurant –$8.10     –$22.00
      –$64.36  10/10 Final Balance   –$45.59
   Overdraft Penalty Fee 
   –$22.00   
      –$86.36      
 10/5 – 4 Debit card purchase at 
  Autozone –$3.23   
      –$89.59   
   Overdraft Penalty Fee 
   –$22.00   
  10/10 Final Balance  –$111.59   
     
  Total Cost of overdraft fees –$88.00   
note: Data in this chart were taken directly from the opinion in Gutierrez v. Wells Fargo Bank. The left column illustrates how Wells Fargo was able 
to charge Ms. Gutierrez four overdraft penalty fees (a total of $88) through manipulating the posting order to deplete her balance more quickly. The 
right column shows what the balance would have been had the transactions been posted chronologically. In the second scenario, Ms. Gutierrez would 
have been charged only a single $22 overdraft penalty fee.70
TABle 2:  From Gutierrez v. Wells Fargo: 
 The effect of High-to-low Posting Order
  Total Cost of overdraft fees –$22.00
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Some courts have dismissed similar cases on the basis that state laws do not apply to 
national banks.71 However, in Gutierrez, the federal court in California rejected this argument 
of preemption and applied state law to find that Wells Fargo’s large-to-small posting order 
for debit card transactions was an unfair and deceptive practice.72 The court also rejected 
the “consumer preference” argument, holding that the bank was required to cover the vast 
majority of the debit card transactions at issue regardless of the amount, as it had already 
authorized the purchase.73 Other pending actions under several state laws have been 
consolidated in the Southern District of Florida.74 All 10 banks in the Pew study are or were 
defendants in the ongoing case.
In order to allow accountholders to track their balances and manage their spending, 
transactions should be processed in a predictable manner that responsible customers can 
follow. Posting order should be objective and neutral rather than designed to maximize fees. 
All transactions should be posted in an order clearly disclosed by the bank as part of the 
consolidated pre-account opening disclosure discussed previously in this report.
One option that would establish policy principles and provide regulatory certainty for banks 
would be a transparent system of “safe harbors,” such as has been used in other financial 
services regulations.75 In this case, bank regulators could create a safe harbor posting protocol 
to apply to all depository institutions and presumptively insulate those following it from 
liability and regulatory scrutiny.76
Such a model could be structured to be both objective and fair, without the effect of 
maximizing overdraft fees. For example, a standard of chronological posting order is neutral 
and transparent to both banks and consumers. The safe harbor protocol also could reflect the 
technical demands of different types of transactions. Bank systems can recreate chronological 
order for any transaction with a time stamp, but a different neutral and objective protocol for 
items lacking a unique time stamp could be used, such as by check number.
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v. dispuTe ResoluTion
All 265 accounts examined had some kind of dispute resolution restriction clause in their 
agreements that limited the options available to a customer seeking to enforce his or 
her rights under the bank’s terms. The overwhelming majority of these, 255 accounts 
(representing eight out of 10 banks), required the accountholder to waive the right to 
trial by jury. For 189 of these accounts (representing four out of 10 banks and 71 percent 
of all accounts), the accountholder had to waive the right to a trial before a judge and 
agree to have the dispute resolved before a private arbiter of the bank’s choice. One bank 
(representing six percent of accounts) required customers to accept binding arbitration if they 
did not explicitly opt out in writing within 45 days of account opening.
On top of these restrictions of consumers’ legal rights, six banks (representing 19 percent 
of accounts) include fee-shifting provisions in their account contracts. If these clauses were 
enforced as written, a customer who prevailed against a bank would theoretically end up 
paying the bank for the results of that win.
Pew’s research shows that Bank of America places the fewest restrictions on customers’ access 
to legal remedies. This bank allowed customers to go before a judge and did not disclose any 
fee-shifting agreements.
Discussion
Nearly three-quarters of the accounts in this report (189 out of 265) included mandatory 
arbitration clauses that prevent customers from going to court to settle a dispute. Some 
academics and advocates have criticized these arbitration agreements and their administration 
as biased in favor of industry.77
The Federal Arbitration Act generally makes arbitration agreements valid as a matter of 
federal law. However, some arbitration agreements have been challenged under the laws of 
several states that prohibit “harsh, one-sided, and oppressive” terms in so-called “contracts 
of adhesion” (i.e., contracts that are not freely negotiated).78 Recently, the U.S. District Court 
for the Southern District of Florida struck down the arbitration agreements of several banks 
TABle 3:  Dispute resolution Provisions
 How do banks restrict customers’ access to courts in the case of dispute?
percentage of accounts
96%
94%
71%
12%
Checking account dispute Resolution Terms
customer waives right to jury trial
customer waives right to class action
customer required to enter binding mandatory arbitration agreements
customer must pay the bank’s losses, costs, and expenses
note: Data represent 265 checking accounts offered by the 10 largest american banks by deposit, which collectively hold nearly 
60 percent of all deposits in the united states. Most accounts disclose more than one dispute resolution restriction.
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because they were buried in single-spaced, small-print, boilerplate language and had terms 
such as limits on class actions and cost-shifting clauses that would prevent a plaintiff from 
hiring a lawyer.79
Finally, some banks in our study allowed customers to take them to court but required the 
customer to pay the bank’s “loss, costs, and expenses” regardless of the outcome. While 
fee-shifting agreements like these are usually held unenforceable against prevailing parties, 
they have the effect of chilling the ability of consumers to enforce the account agreement.80
FIgUre 3:  A “loss, Costs, and expenses” Clause
 —From the PNC Account Agreement
The Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 requires the CFPB to study and 
report to Congress on the use of arbitration agreements in financial products and services.81 
Based on this research, the CFPB is authorized to prohibit or impose limitations on these 
agreements should it find that to do so protects consumers and is in the public interest.82
vi. THe CosT of a CHeCking aCCounT
For this report, Pew tracked bank practices regarding the cost of the important fees and the 
terms of the key policies included in the model disclosure box in Figure 2. Table 4 summarizes 
Pew’s findings on this data collected from the checking accounts offered by the banks 
included in this study.
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ACCOUNT DISCLOSURES
 Median Length of Disclosures 111  pages
ACCOUNT OPENING & USAGE
 Minimum amount needed to open account $100
 Monthly Fee $8.95
 Minimum combined account balance 86%  of accounts waived a monthly fee with a minimum balance.   
 to avoid Monthly Fee  $2,500 median minimum combined account balance
 Direct Deposit to avoid Monthly Fee 43%  of checking accounts with a monthly fee waived that fee if the
   customer had a recurring direct deposit.
 interest none
 non-Proprietary bank atM Fees $2  per transaction
 non-sufficient Funds (nsF) Fee $35  per item
 Returned check Fee $12  per declined check written to the customer’s account
 stop Payment Fee $29  per item to stop payment for up to six months
 account closing Fee none
 other service Fees 40 the median number of additional service fees, ranging from
   $1.50 to $175.00
oveRdRafT opTions
 overdraft Penalty Fee $35  per item covered by bank advance
 Maximum number of overdraft 
4 Penalty Fees per Day 
 extended overdraft Penalty Fee $25  every seventh day the account is overdrawn
 overdraft transfer Fee $10  per transfer from linked savings account, line of credit or credit card
 no overdraft service for Point-of-sale    if a customer chooses not to opt in to any overdraft service for
 (Pos) Debit and atM transactions   these transactions, those that would cause an overdraft
 (Default option)  will be declined at no cost.
pRoCessing poliCies
 Posting order* (the order in which deposits all  banks reserved the right to reorder withdrawals from highest to 
 and withdrawals are processed)  lowest for all their accounts. 
  52%  of accounts reserve the right to post withdrawals before deposits.
 Deposit hold Policy (how soon funds are   • Cash deposit with teller/ATM: Same business day
 available after they are deposited)  • Check deposit with teller/ATM: Next business day
   • Direct deposit/wire transfer: Same business day
    A “business day” is a non-holiday weekday. The end of a 
    business day varies by bank and by branch, but it is no   
    earlier than 2:00 p.m.
dispuTe ResoluTion
 Dispute Resolution Restrictions 100%  of accounts restricted customers’ rights to settle legal disputes.
  71%  of accounts had mandatory arbitration agreements. 
  12%  of accounts might have allowed customers to take the bank to
   court but required the customer to pay any “loss, costs, and
   expenses” the bank incurs.
 
note: Data represent 265 checking accounts offered by the 10 largest american banks by deposit, which collectively hold nearly 60 percent of all 
deposits in the united states as of october 2010. see appendix a for an explanation of these fees and terms. all numbers are medians and all text 
represents the most common versions of important account provisions. 
*as of the publication date, a limited number of banks have indicated they will no longer reorder some transactions for at least a portion of their accounts.
TABle 4:  Median Fees and Most Common Policies for 
 Checking Accounts as of October 2010
 What does the median checking account look like?
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concLusion
Pew’s research shows that it is exceedingly difficult for an average American to find the basic 
information needed to either select a checking account or to responsibly manage his or 
her existing account. Assembling information from over 100 pages of disclosure materials 
represents a daunting task, even for the most financially savvy consumer. Such deficiencies 
call for action that requires depository institutions to disclose fully and clearly key checking 
account terms, policies, and fees in a concise, consolidated format.
Furthermore, consumers must be provided with complete and unbiased information in 
regards to overdraft options. Accountholders should not be subjected to unrestrained 
overdraft fees or to hidden practices that maximize overdrafts. Overdraft fees, like other 
penalty fees, should be responsible and proportional to the bank’s cost. Posting order should 
be objective, neutral, and clearly disclosed, and should not be used to maximize overdraft 
fees. Finally, the CFPB, in its study of binding arbitration clauses, should include a thorough 
examination of clauses that purport to make accountholders liable for the bank’s costs 
regardless of the outcome of the case.
The free market system is predicated on the idea of competition. Increased disclosure, 
presented in an understandable format, helps create a better-functioning marketplace by 
allowing consumers to compare prices and features. Potential customers have the opportunity 
to preview terms and conditions for some financial products. For example, credit cards are 
required by law to disclose key terms and conditions in an easy-to-read format (the Schumer 
Box) before a potential customer applies for a card. Similarly, mortgage originators are 
required to provide families considering the purchase of a home with a good faith estimate.
We encourage similar transparency in checking accounts that will stimulate a healthier 
marketplace for consumers and banks alike. Amending and simplifying this process is essential 
for competition to thrive.
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poliCy ReCommendaTions
Pew recommends the following policy solutions to address the findings of our study. While 
industry can make these changes voluntarily, policy makers should create a level playing field.
DiscLosuRe
Policy makers should require depository institutions to provide information about 
checking account terms, conditions, and fees in a concise, easy-to-read format, similar to 
the Schumer Box used for credit cards. Pew has developed a disclosure box (Figure 2) as 
a model for providing such information to consumers.
oveRDRaFt oPtions
Policy makers should require depository institutions to provide accountholders with clear, 
comprehensive pricing information for all available overdraft options when a customer 
is considering opting in to a program so that the customer can make the best choice 
among overdraft options, including choosing not to opt in for any overdraft coverage.
oveRDRaFt Fees
Policy makers should require overdraft penalty fees to be reasonable and proportional to 
the bank’s costs in providing the overdraft loan. Furthermore, we suggest that regulators 
monitor overdraft transfer fees and impose similar reasonable and proportional 
requirements on them if it appears that they are becoming so disproportionate as to 
suggest that they have become penalty fees as well.
PRocessing oF DePosits anD WithDRaWaLs
Policy makers should require depository institutions to post deposits and withdrawals in 
a fully disclosed, objective and neutral manner that does not maximize overdraft fees, 
such as in chronological order.
DisPute ResoLution
The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, in its study of arbitration agreements, should 
examine the prevalence of binding arbitration clauses, of fee-shifting provisions, and 
of “loss, costs, and expenses” clauses in checking accounts and assess whether such 
provisions prevent consumers from obtaining relief.
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appendix a: expliCaTion of Table 4—median fees and 
mosT Common poliCies foR CHeCking aCCounTs
Checking accounts come with a wide range of fees, terms, and conditions. For the purposes 
of this report, Pew has grouped all pricing and policy information into four categories that 
reflect how customers use their accounts:
•	 Account Opening and Usage
•	 Overdraft Options
•	 Processing Policies
•	 Dispute Resolution
account oPening anD usage
Like any consumer product or service, there are costs to the customer for opening and 
maintaining checking accounts. The fees and policies assessed in this section are ones that a 
customer is likely to deal with on a day-to-day basis, even if he or she has not overdrawn his 
or her account or entered into a legal dispute with his or her bank.
minimum deposit needed to open account
Eight out of 10 banks (91 percent of accounts) required some minimum deposit to open an 
account. Among all of the accounts analyzed, the median minimum deposit needed to open 
an account was $100. The minimum opening balance ranged from $0 to $500.
monthly fee
Eighty-seven percent of examined checking accounts disclosed a monthly maintenance fee 
that the bank may charge customers at the end of every statement cycle. Only 13 percent of 
accounts (35 out of 265) had no monthly fee (commonly called “free checking”). The median 
monthly fee for checking accounts was $8.95. Across all accounts that charged a monthly fee, 
this fee ranged from $3 to $50.
bank-provided information on Requirements to Waive monthly fee
While most checking accounts in our study had a monthly fee, the vast majority of these (228 
accounts out of 230) also had provisions that allowed the fee to be waived if the customer met 
certain requirements. These requirements varied from account to account. The two most common 
ways for a customer to avoid paying a monthly fee were by maintaining a minimum combined 
account balance or by having a recurring direct deposit. A few banks allowed customers to not 
incur such a fee by using electronic banking rather than in-person or paper services.
Minimum Combined Account Balance
Eighty-six percent of the accounts analyzed that had a monthly fee (198 of 230 such 
accounts) waived that fee if the customer maintained a minimum combined account 
balance. For this purpose, banks generally look at the combined account balance for all 
of the customer’s deposits, loans, and investment balances with that bank. Depending 
on the institution and the particular checking account, this balance can include a 
customer’s checking account, savings account, mortgage, credit cards, lines of credit, 
money market account, certificates of deposit, or other accounts. The median minimum 
combined account balance needed to avoid a monthly fee was $2,500. The lowest 
instance of this requirement was $100, and the highest instance was $100,000.
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Recurring Direct Deposit
A recurring direct deposit is an electronic ACH transfer of funds into a consumer’s 
account at least once every statement cycle. Examples include payroll checks or benefits 
such as Social Security. Of the 230 checking accounts studied that had a monthly fee, 
100 of them (43 percent) waived their monthly fees if the customer had a recurring direct 
deposit. Two banks (33 percent of accounts with a monthly fee) disclosed a required 
minimum direct deposit dollar amount in order to qualify for the waiver. The median 
direct deposit required by these banks was $100, with a range of $25 to $250 among 
their accounts.
Other Ways to Avoid Monthly Fees
While maintaining a minimum combined account balance or having a recurring direct 
deposit were the two most common ways that banks allowed a customer to avoid a 
monthly fee, several accounts had other unique requirements for waiving the charge. 
In the accounts in our study, these focused on the customer’s use of electronic banking 
mechanisms rather than in-person or paper-based services.
For example, customers who have Bank of America’s eBanking accounts can avoid 
a monthly fee if they use only self-service options (ATM, online, mobile) for deposits 
and withdrawals and receive only paperless statements. Citibank disclosed that it will 
waive the Basic Checking monthly fee if the customer makes at least five qualifying 
transactions per statement cycle, with “qualifying transactions” defined as POS debit; 
check debit; bill payment via telephone, online, or mobile banking; auto deduction/ACH 
payment; or an ATM cash withdrawal.
interest
Although traditionally one distinguishing difference between checking and savings accounts 
was that the latter allowed the customer to accrue interest on his or her deposits, a large 
number of checking accounts examined also offered the customer the opportunity to receive 
interest on his or her deposits. In fact, 109 out of 265 checking accounts studied (41 percent) 
were interest bearing.
fees at non-proprietary aTms
All banks studied allowed their checking account customers to use their banks’ own ATMs 
without charging a fee for almost all transactions except for an account statement request. 
Banks did not disclose if the report is provided as a printed copy or an on-screen display. 
However, eight out of 10 banks and 90 percent of accounts charged their customers a fee for 
using an out-of-network ATM. The median fee for using another bank’s ATM was $2. For those 
banks that charged this fee, it ranged from $2 for some accounts to $2.50 for other accounts. 
The non-proprietary ATM fee charged to the customer by his or her bank is in addition to any 
fees charged to the customer by the owner of that non-proprietary ATM.
Returned Check fee
If a customer attempts to deposit a check into his or her checking account and the check 
does not clear, all of the banks studied charged the depositing customer a returned check 
fee. The median returned check fee for all accounts was $12, with a range of $10 to $40 
among all accounts.
stop payment fee
If a customer asks his or her bank to halt the processing of a check written by the customer 
(and the resulting withdrawal of funds from his or her checking account), the bank will 
generally do so for a period of time and charge the customer a stop payment fee. The median 
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stop payment fee was $29. For those accounts that charge a stop payment fee (92 percent of 
accounts), the fee ranged from $25 to $50. The stop payment orders for nine out of 10 banks 
(97 percent of accounts) lasted six months but were renewable for a repeat fee.83 The one 
remaining bank’s stop payment period was one year.
account Closing fee
Six out of the 10 banks examined (representing 38 percent of accounts) charged a fee if a 
customer closed his or her account within a specified and relatively brief period of time after 
the initial opening of the account. Among the banks charging a fee, this fee ranged from $20 
to $30, and the period of time ranged from within 90 to 180 days of opening the account.
other service fees
While this report considers nine different fees in depth, it should be noted that checking 
accounts have other associated fees. The median account had 40 other service fees beyond 
those discussed here, while some accounts had as few as seven and some had as many as 54. 
These fees, usually disclosed on fee schedule documents, ranged in cost from $1.50 to $175. 
They included such diverse charges as the “Staff Assisted Requests for Any Item or Statement 
Copy” fee, the “Foreign Check Clearing Services for up to US $5,000 Drawn from Canadian 
Banks” fee, the “Online External Transfer to Your Accounts at Other Financial Institutions” fee 
and the “Large Amount of Coins Deposited” fee.
appendix b: meTHodology
TABle 5:  list of Banks reviewed by Pew
Bank
percentage of 
Total u.s. deposits 
Held by bank
value of 
deposits in bank
13.3%
12.1%
11.1%
11.1%
2.5%
2.4%
1.7%
1.6%
1.6%
1.6%
59%
$976,953,347,000
$887,805,000,000
$816,409,000,000
$813,951,000,000
$183,123,000,000
$178,875,108,000
$128,177,056,000
$118,668,103,000
$117,331,543,000
$116,679,948,000
$4,337,973,105,000
Bank of America
JP Morgan Chase
Wells Fargo
Citigroup
U.S. Bank
PNC
TD Bank
Sun Trust
Capital One
HSBC
Total
note: Data on deposit volume are from Payments source, a self-reported banking industry database, 
and are current as of october 6, 2010. the table shows the percentage of all deposits in the united 
states held by these 10 banks and the value of those deposits.
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Data coLLection
Through this and future research documenting checking account practices, the Pew Health 
Group’s Safe Checking in the Electronic Age Project seeks to provide information and 
recommendations to support the development of sound policy, regulatory, and business 
decisions.
Data in this report are based on an analysis of checking account agreements, Web page 
documentation, and fee schedules posted online by the largest 10 banks as identified by their 
holding companies’ deposit volume as of October 2010. For instance, Citigroup is listed as 
one of the top 10 institutions by deposit volume, and Pew’s research staff identified its affiliate 
bank, Citibank, for data collection. All deposit volume data come from Payment Source, a 
self-reported banking industry database. These banks account for 59 percent of all deposit 
volume. Information regarding the individual bank’s retail checking line deposit volume was 
unavailable. Pew researchers collected data in October 2010.
Due to state variations in many checking account terms and fees, Pew researchers identified 
265 distinct accounts offered by the largest 10 banks.
Information about checking accounts’ fees, terms, and conditions is spread across various 
bank Web pages and documents, many of which are not readily available. When trying 
to find checking account information and account documents—such as an account 
agreement, account agreement addendum, or fee schedule—for each account, the avenues 
of investigation that follow were tried in order until the data were found. Pew researchers 
determined that the following ranking of data locations represented a progression from most 
to least accessible location of information.
1. Visiting the “Account Web Page” (the main page for an account on a bank’s Web site)
2. Following any links to documents “clickable” from the account Web page
3. Browsing the bank’s Web site for other informative pages
4. Using selected keywords to search the bank’s Web site for account documents
5. Calling a bank’s main customer service line to request account documents by fax or mail
6. Calling a local bank branch (closest to Pew) to request account documents by fax or mail
7. Visiting that local bank branch in person to acquire copies of account documents
8. Obtaining information from an online or telephone bank representative (not in writing)
Pew researchers collected and saved all account documents and information over a two-week 
period in October 2010.
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cLassiFication oF Data baseD on souRce
The varying methods outlined above for obtaining information about the checking accounts 
examined by Pew form the basis for how Pew classified each individual piece of data.
In this report, there are nine data source categories. The categories are:
•	 Data found on account Web page
•	 Data found in fee schedule clickable from account Web page
•	 Data found in account agreement or addendum clickable from account Web page
•	 Data found on a separate page of the bank’s Web site
•	 Data found in fee schedule available only through search of bank’s Web site
•	 Data found in account agreement or addendum available only through search of bank’s 
Web site
•	 Data found in fee schedule available only by visiting bank branch
•	 Data found in account agreement available only by visiting bank branch
•	 Data not available in writing either on a document or on the bank’s Web site
account seLection
Each checking account that Pew examined had the following characteristics identifying it as a 
distinct account:
•	 Bank offering the account
•	 Name of account
•	 State(s) where account agreement was valid
•	 State(s) where account agreement addendum was valid
•	 State(s) where fee schedule was valid
•	 State(s) where additional account document(s) were valid
For example, although there are only three checking accounts listed on Bank of America’s 
checking accounts home page—Advantage with Tiered Interest, eBanking, and MyAccess 
Checking—Bank of America actually has 38 checking accounts in this study because the 
terms and conditions of each type of checking account are not the same in all 50 U.S. states. 
Account documents that are valid in one state or group of states are inaccurate and invalid 
in other states. Another incidence in which checking accounts were differentiated involves a 
situation in which the same account agreement might apply in a particular group of states, 
but those checking accounts might not share the same fee schedule. Examples such as these 
required more complicated sorting to make sure that each checking account identified by 
Pew used only one set of account documents. This system resulted in an accurate count of the 
number of wholly unique checking accounts offered by the 10 largest U.S. banks.
In the simplest instances, some banks had only one version of each account document. For 
other banks, there were variations in their account documents between states or groups of 
states, but these variations occurred uniformly across all account documents. In other words, 
if there were three variations of an account agreement addendum in which each represented 
a third of the U.S. states, there were also three variations of a fee schedule that corresponded 
exactly to the state groups in one of the account agreement addendum’s variations.
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In the most complicated situations, the groups of states in various iterations of one account 
document did not match the groups of states represented in the variations of another account 
document. For example, a hypothetical checking account might have an account agreement 
addendum with two variations—one for CT, MA, NJ, NY, PA (“A”) and one for DE, MD, NH, 
RI, VT (“B”). At the same time, its fee schedule might have two different variations—one for 
CT, MA, NH, RI, VT (“1”) and one for DE, MD, NJ, NY, PA (“2”).
To resolve this, Pew researchers created a table to sort out the wholly unique accounts. 
This table, an example of which appears below, would sort first by the account agreement 
addendum area (“A” or “B”) and then by the fee schedule area (“1” or “2”). This arrangement 
made it easy to see in which states a checking account shared the same version of both 
documents; in other words, researchers were able to determine in which states the variations 
of the account were identical and thus suitable to be recognized by Pew in this study as the 
same account.
In the sorting example shown in Table 6, account document variations produced four distinct 
versions of a generic checking account.
TABle 6:  example of How Unique Accounts Were Sorted
states
account agreement 
addendum area
fee schedule area final account groupings
ct a 1
generic account ct, Ma
Ma a 1
nJ a 2
generic account 
nJ, nY, Pa
nY a 2
Pa a 2
nh b 1
generic account 
nh, Ri, vt
Ri b 1
vt b 1
De b 2
generic account De, MD
MD b 2
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